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Abstract 
 
There is a long tradition of political thought that takes the use of religious reasons for supporting 
public policy to be a violation of one’s duties as a citizen.  I refer to this as the ‘liberal position.’ But is 
this line of thought correct? In this paper, I examine three philosophers’ views on the matter, before 
staking out my own. First, I examine the position of John Rawls, the most influential contemporary 
heir of the liberal tradition. Then, I look towards Nicholas Wolterstorff for his charges against Rawls 
and this tradition, as well as his own view of the duties of citizens. Thirdly, I use Richard Rorty to 
examine how an antifoundationalist (like Wolterstorff) might respond to Wolterstorff in defense of the 
liberal position. Finally, I offer my own position, which uses the virtue of agreeableness to strike a 
balance between Wolterstorff and Rorty. The thrust of my argument is that this debate should transfer 
from one concerned with “religious” versus “secular” reasons to one concerned with fundamentalist 
versus pragmatist attitudes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a long tradition of political thought which takes the use of religious reasons for 
supporting public policy to be a violation of one’s duties as a citizen.  I will refer to this 
as the ‘liberal position.’1  But is this line of thought correct?  In this paper, I will 
examine three philosophers’ views on the matter, before staking out my own.  First, I 
will examine the position of John Rawls, the most influential contemporary heir of the 
liberal tradition.  Then, I will look towards Nicholas Wolterstorff for his charges 
against Rawls and this tradition, as well as his own view of the duties of citizens.  
Thirdly, I will use Richard Rorty to examine how an antifoundationalist (like 
Wolterstorff) might respond to Wolterstorff in defense of the liberal position.  Finally, I 
                                                          
1 It should be noted straightaway that the ‘liberal position’ can be a misleading term.  All three of 
the authors I will be examining are ardent supporters of liberal democracy.  What I mean by the 
‘liberal position’ is just what I said at the outset: the view that the use of religious reasons (and 
reasons derived from one’s comprehensive philosophical perspective) to support policy decisions 
violates one’s duties as a citizen. 
Res Cogitans (2014) 5                                                                                                         Morano | 112 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
will offer my own position, which uses the virtue of agreeableness to strike a balance 
between Wolterstorff and Rorty. 
 
John Rawls: The Liberal Position as Overlapping Consensus and Public Reason 
 
We live in a world of reasonable pluralism.  By this I mean that many people hold 
conflicting and incommensurable comprehensive perspectives, and are justified in 
doing so.  People have different religions and views of the ultimate good, not all of 
which can be true.  And yet, these people are perfectly reasonable in holding these 
positions.  But given this reasonable pluralism, how are we to achieve social unity?  
That is, how can we come together and agree upon a fair system of cooperation, rules 
of engagement which are to be recognized as fair and equal across all of these 
comprehensive perspectives?  This is the problem by which Rawls is motivated. 
 
Rawls tries to secure social unity in a world of reasonable pluralism with the idea of 
overlapping consensus.  Overlapping consensus is based on the idea that a political 
conception of justice can be agreed to by persons who hold a range of reasonable 
comprehensive perspectives.  If each person is able to agree to the political conception 
of justice from his or her own comprehensive perspective, social unity will be secured.  
 
Rawls wants to distinguish political conceptions of justice from conceptions based on 
comprehensive perspectives.  He thinks that “no comprehensive doctrine is appropriate 
as a political conception” (PL 135) for the simple reason that “a reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine cannot secure the basis of social unity” (PL 134).  Since no 
comprehensive doctrine (religious or philosophical) can achieve overlapping consensus, 
Rawls thinks that we must, instead, collect “such settled convictions as the belief in 
religious toleration and the rejection of slavery” and then “try to organize the basic 
intuitive ideas and principles implicit in these convictions into a coherent conception of 
justice” (JF 225-6).  Basically, Rawls’ idea is that we ought to take convictions shared 
throughout the society’s political culture and create a conception of justice which is 
based upon the underlying ideas of those convictions.  For instance, Rawls takes the 
convictions of religious toleration and the rejection of slavery to express the underlying 
idea that, in America, we consider factors such as one’s race and one’s religion to be 
arbitrary from a moral point of view.  He then builds up his conception of justice, 
justice as fairness, off of the idea that these, and other consistent factors such as one’s 
socioeconomic status, are irrelevant to one’s interests when looking for principles of 
justice which can be “agreed to in an initial situation that is fair” (TJ 11).  Stepping 
back from justice as fairness, Rawls’ point is that only political conceptions of justice - 
ones which are organized out of the shared political convictions of the culture - are 
capable of achieving overlapping consensus. 
 
Rawls thinks there is one other thing which can be agreed to through overlapping 
consensus: public reason.  Public reason is a framework which persons in a liberal 
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democracy agree to structure their arguments within to engage in public debate.  Rawls 
thinks that public reason is needed because of the nature of political power in liberal 
democracies.  For Rawls, “political power, which is always coercive power, is the 
power of the public, that is, of free and equal citizens as a collective body” (PL 216).  
Citizens are, by voting, exerting some sort of coercion onto their fellow citizens.  
Therefore, if a citizen bases her public policy decisions solely upon her comprehensive 
doctrine, she will be exerting an unjust form of coercion upon her fellow citizens.  For 
the policy she wishes to apply to everyone is decided based upon reasons that she 
knows not everyone else can accept.  Therefore, Rawls claims that:  
 
“our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is 
exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens 
may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to them as reasonable and rational...the ideal of citizenship imposes a 
moral, not a legal, duty - the duty of civility - to be able to explain to one 
another...how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be 
supported by the political values of public reason” (PL 217). 
 
Note here that Rawls’ conception of public reason is quite scarce.  Really, it is just the 
idea that we ought to be able to justify our policy decisions on grounds which all 
members of a pluralistic society can, in principle, accept.  This certainly excludes 
religious and deeply philosophical grounds.  But it does not do much else.  Later, Rawls 
says that public reason really just means “that each of us must have, and be ready to 
explain, a criterion of what principles and guidelines we think other citizens...may 
reasonably be expected to endorse along with us” (PL 226).  Thus, Rawls thinks that 
public reason requires us to frame our policy decisions around some criterion which can 
be proposed to other citizens as reasonable for them to endorse as well, despite their 
different comprehensive perspectives.  To base a policy decision on one’s 
comprehensive perspective, e.g. one’s religion, is a violation of one’s moral duties as a 
citizen.  Hence, Rawls’ notion of public reason commits him to the liberal position. 
 
Nicholas Wolterstorff: The Liberal Position as Illiberal and the Consocial 
Alternative 
 
Nicholas Wolterstorff offers what I consider to be a devastating critique of Rawls.  This 
is the critique that Rawls is actually sneaking in remnants of Enlightenment 
epistemology.  Wolterstorff points out that Rawls’ position depends upon his claim that 
principles proposed in conformity with public reason “must be ones that one can 
reasonably expect all citizens to endorse who use the light of our common human 
reason” (RPS 98).  Wolterstorff goes on to point out that there really is no such thing as 
common human reason; there is no capacity called ‘reason’ which all humans 
inherently have in common.  He claims that “what we come to believe by the use of our 
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reason (whatever Rawls might have in mind by that) is a function, in part, of what we 
already believe...[that is,] our comprehensive perspectives” (98). 
 
This critique seems quite cogent, and also quite fatal for Rawls’ notion of public 
reason.  For remember that a central part of public reason is that it involves some 
criterion we can reasonably expect our fellow citizens to endorse.  Now, if what 
criterion we can reasonably expect them to endorse is a function of their comprehensive 
perspectives, then it seems there will be no single “public reason” which achieves 
overlapping consensus.  “Public” reason will have to vary from group to group.  For the 
accepted criterion will differ with each group.  That is, without some common faculty 
of “reason” against which we can test our criterion of public reason, we are stuck 
testing it against each comprehensive perspective.  But in this case, we no longer have 
some kind of public reason.  We merely have reasons which are acceptable to some 
perspectives and not others. 
 
The great achievement of Rawls’ idea of overlapping consensus was that he was 
thoroughly historicist, opting to base political conceptions of justice on the shared 
convictions of contemporary political culture, rather than some ahistorical, universal 
human faculty.  However, his idea of public reason does exactly the opposite.  Without 
some faculty of “reason” which is common to all citizens, we really have no basis for 
the requirement.  All we have are principles which are accepted by some perspectives 
and not others.  And Wolterstorff goes on to point out, quite elegantly, that “[in] a 
democracy...[we] listen and try to persuade.  Typically our attempts at persuasion are 
on an ad hoc basis: offering to Republicans reasons that we think might appeal to 
them... to Democrats reasons that we think might appeal to them... to Christians reasons 
that we think might appeal to them” (RPS 108) and so on.   
 
Taking a single criterion and assuming that since it isn’t based in some comprehensive 
perspective (which is a questionable claim in the first place), it will be reasonable to all, 
is not only theoretically problematic, but impractical.  It is theoretically problematic 
just because there is no common human reason by which everyone will test that 
criterion.  It is impractical for the same reason: since there is no common human 
reason, there is no one-size-fits-all argument to persuade others.  If we are trying to 
reach consensus, we must offer each perspective reasons for why they ought to support 
this policy, not some a-perspectival criterion.  Such a move is more likely to provoke an 
attack of this criterion than persuasion and agreement.  Thus, Rawls’ notion of public 
reason, and therefore his rationale for the liberal position, seems to be fatally flawed. 
 
Wolterstorff proposes, instead, his own “consocial” position.  This position puts no 
restraint on the use of religious reasons: let citizens use whatever reasons they see fit.  
However, he does not mean by this that there are no appropriate restraints on citizens.  
Indeed, he identifies three: (1) civility in the manner of debate, (2) with the exception of 
extreme cases, that debate be conducted and resolved in accord with the laws of the 
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land, and (3) that the overall goal of the debates is political justice.  In (1), Wolterstorff 
suggests virtues of civility which ought to be imposed upon the citizen.  These are quite 
thick for him, involving listening to the other side and being open to changing one’s 
mind.  In (2), Wolterstorff makes the obvious claim that public debate ought to obey the 
law, unless there are extreme circumstances of massive injustice in the political 
systems.  Finally, in (3), Wolterstorff actually sides with proponents of the liberal 
position.  Rather than aim for some view of the good, our policies ought to aim for 
justice among people with competing views of the good.  However, Wolterstorff’s 
contention with the liberal tradition is that (3) does not restrict religious reasons, but 
rather a political agenda of mere self-interest. 
 
Richard Rorty: Conversation-Stoppers and the Importance of Consensus 
 
In 1994, Rorty wrote a book review entitled “Religion as a Conversation-stopper.”  In 
it, he argues that religion ought to be kept out of public debate for a number of reasons.  
First, he calls upon the “Jeffersonian compromise” of trading the privatization of 
religion for religious freedom.  He thinks that, since religion is a private matter, it is 
irrelevant in public debate.  This is why he famously calls religion a conversation-
stopper.  Rorty claims that invoking your understanding of God’s will in public policy 
discussions is similar to telling your interlocutors: “‘I would never have an abortion’ or, 
‘Reading pornography is about the only pleasure I get out of life these days.’  In these 
examples...the ensuing silence masks the group’s inclination to say, ‘So what?  We 
weren’t discussing your private life; we were discussing public policy.  Don’t bother us 
with matters that are not our concern’” (PSH 171).  Rorty’s idea is that religion is a 
matter of striving for private perfection, not a matter of proper public policy.  
Therefore, its intrusion into policy discussion can do nothing but stop the conversation 
at hand. 
 
Rorty received a good deal of heat for this essay.  In particular, Wolterstorff wrote a 
very persuasive essay called “An Engagement with Rorty.”  In it, Wolterstorff points to 
a great deal of views that he and Rorty have in common, and shows that Rorty’s 
support of the liberal position is in deep conflict with his other views.  Primarily, 
though, he argues that religion should not and need not be a conversation-stopper.  For 
in normal conversation, people do not limit the discussion to premises held in common.  
He says, “In the conversation between Rorty and me today, are we limiting ourselves to 
premises held in common? How would we tell? Rorty and I each entered this 
conversation believing what we did, and we just started talking about the topic at hand” 
(ER, IV).  He admits that interlocutors certainly probe for points of agreement in order 
to level persuasive arguments against one another, but this hardly qualifies as limiting 
the conversation to premises held in common. 
 
Wolterstorff’s critique had an impact on Rorty, prompting a response in 2003 entitled 
“Religion in the Public Square: A Reconsideration.”  In it, Rorty openly admits that his 
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prior essay had been “hasty and insufficiently thoughtful” (RR 456).  Nevertheless, he 
retains some elements of his former critique.  In particular, he still wants to maintain 
that conversation-stoppers are bad for democracy.  But he now recognizes both that 
religious appeals are not necessarily conversation-stoppers and that, ultimately, we all 
rest upon first principles which act as conversation-stoppers.  What Rorty now wants to 
argue against are mere appeals to authority.  He concludes that “instead of saying 
religion was a conversation-stopper, I should have simply said that citizens of a 
democracy should try to put off invoking conversation-stoppers as long as possible.  
We should do our best to keep the conversation going without citing unarguable first 
principles, either philosophical or religious” (RR 462).  Rorty thinks we should do 
exactly what Wolterstorff suggested before: come to the conversation with our beliefs 
and try to construct a persuasive dialogue. 
 
However, Rorty’s most interesting critique is a little more harsh on religion.  In this 
critique, Rorty claims that religion ought to be “pruned back to the parish level” of 
“[helping] individuals find meaning in their lives, and...[serving] as a help to 
individuals in times of troubles” (RR 457).  This will be replaced, on the social and 
institutional level, by “an increased sense of participation in the advance of humanity - 
theists and atheists together, shoulder to shoulder - toward the fulfillment of social 
ideals” (ibid).  Here, Rorty taunts his beloved Deweyan conception of democracy.  For 
Rorty, democracy is an end in itself, a symbol of ultimate importance.  Democracy is 
good for “making possible the invention of new forms of human freedom, taking 
liberties never taken before” (PSH 126).  All of this might seem very romanticized and 
almost religious.  This is certainly true, something even Rorty will admit.  But there is 
an important substantive claim here. 
 
In his book, Achieving Our Country, Rorty suggests that the new ‘cultural’ left has a lot 
to learn from the old pre-sixties left, and that it ought to try to replicate them on many 
fronts.  One front is the point just made.  It is that, in dealing with oppression, the pre-
sixties left “did so by proclaiming that all of us - black, white, and brown - are 
Americans, and that we should respect one another as such” (AOC 100).  Rorty 
contrasts this with the new cultural left’s emphasis on “[respecting] one another in our 
differences” (ibid).  That is, the intellectual tendency nowadays is to preserve our 
otherness and embrace it.  This is seen in Wolterstorff’s claim that “[we] must learn to 
live with a politics of multiple communities” (RPS 109).  Certainly there is truth to this, 
and it is perfectly reasonable, especially for oppressed groups, to take pride in one’s 
‘otherness.’  But Rorty is wise to point out that “insofar as this pride prevents someone 
from also taking pride in being an American citizen...or from being able to join with 
straights or whites in reformist initiatives, it is a political disaster” (AOC 100).  For the 
strategy of the pre-sixties approach - “the rhetorical question... ‘What do our 
differences matter, compared with our commonality as fellow Americans?” (ibid) - was 
extremely effective at creating a sense of commonality.  And Rorty is also wise to point 
Res Cogitans (2014) 5                                                                                                         Morano | 117 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
out that “only a rhetoric of commonality can forge a winning majority in national 
elections” (AOC 101). 
 
The key point here is that we ought to emphasize our similarities more than our 
differences.  Part of Rorty’s problem with religious rhetoric in politics is that it is 
immediately alienating to those outside of the faith-tradition.  Contrast this with a 
rhetoric based on democracy and our fraternity as fellow Americans (black and white, 
theists and atheists), and we have a far more inclusive basis for creating a sense of 
commonality.  Difference is important, but in free institutions we do not have to 
worry about maintaining difference; it is inevitable.  What we do have to worry about 
is creating enough commonality and fraternity that democracy can flourish.  In order 
to achieve consensus and move public policy forward, it is prudent to focus on points 
of agreement. 
 
My Take: The Virtue of Agreeableness 
 
I think that the central difference between Rorty and Wolterstorff has less to do with 
substantive matters and more to do with emphasis.  That is, I see Rorty as stressing 
democracy as opposed to Wolterstorff stressing liberalism.  Wolterstorff’s biggest 
concern is letting each person choose for themselves.  This is why his bold statement is 
centered around no restraints on the reasons citizens are allowed to use.  Let everyone 
use whatever reasons they want, so long as they don’t conflict with the liberties of 
others!  Rorty, on the contrary, is primarily concerned with democracy: debate, 
consensus, and reform.  This is why his bold statement is centered around the 
conversation.  He is concerned with making a better, more interesting democratic 
conversation.  He wants us to focus on our commonality as Americans so that we can 
advance common social ideals.  Therefore, the real trick is to find a balance between 
these two: respecting our differences as liberals and working together as democrats. 
 
My claim is that the most useful concept here is the virtue of agreeableness.  As citizens 
of a liberal democracy, we have a duty to keep democratic institutions in good working 
order.  One thing which is crippling to democratic institutions is deep, fundamental 
disagreement.  This is the kind of disagreement which cannot be settled through 
conversations.  This is also the kind of disagreement which cannot be settled through a 
majority vote, for, in this kind of disagreement, the minority always feels embittered 
and resentful.  Therefore, I propose that as democratic citizens, we have a duty to strive 
for the virtue of agreeableness. 
 
The virtue of agreeableness consists of many different things.  Like all virtues, it has a 
basis and a form of response.  The basis is the type of circumstance in which we can 
exhibit the virtue (or fail to do so).  In the case of agreeableness, this circumstance is 
disagreement.  Without disagreement, we would have no opportunities to be agreeable.  
The form of response is a little more difficult to characterize.  Certainly, it consists of 
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really listening to others and being open to changing one’s mind, as Wolterstorff claims 
of the virtue of civility.  But, further, it consists of focusing on points of agreement to 
move policy discussion forward.  The agreeable person wants to find what we agree on 
and how we can form a productive discussion based on those points of reference.  The 
agreeable person is not interested in going back and forth in endless debates over 
fundamentals; the agreeable person wants to find shared opinions at whatever level she 
can.  She does just what Rorty and Wolterstorff agreed upon: comes to the conversation 
with her beliefs and tries to start a constructive dialogue.  The emphasis for the 
agreeable person, though, is on constructive. 
 
The real problem with religious reasons is when they are used as Rorty feared: as mere 
appeals to authority.  But the same is true of any comprehensive perspective.  Since 
unarguable first principles are fundamental, the agreeable person wants to avoid 
reference to them for as long as possible.  Her aim is to keep the conversation going by 
focusing on points of agreement.  This is Rorty’s democratic point.  But the agreeable 
person is willing to level policy discussions on whatever grounds her interlocutor 
chooses.  If it means achieving consensus, the agreeable person is perfectly willing to 
offer Christian reasons to Christians, Muslim reasons to Muslims, utilitarian reasons to 
utilitarians, and so on.  Her aim is to keep the conversation going in order to achieve 
agreement, but because of this she is willing to keep it going in whatever fashion her 
interlocutor accepts.  This is Wolterstorff’s liberal point. 
 
There are many advantages to this view.  First, it does the same work that Rawls tried 
to do with public reason by giving us a method of resolving conflicts and appealing to 
our fellow citizens on grounds they can accept.  But it does this not by some 
principle, which is static and therefore unsuitable to deal with the many 
comprehensive perspectives we are confronted by in a liberal democracy.  Rather, it 
appeals to a virtue, which is dynamic and therefore perfectly suitable to deal with a 
procedure that is going to change with each interlocutor.  That is, with a principle of 
public reason, we were stuck having to use the same criterion for each different 
group.  However, with a virtue, we can account for the need to use different types of 
reasons with different interlocutors.  This is because the virtue of agreeableness does 
not specify the particular points of agreement to be settled on, but rather the manner 
of behaving in response to disagreement. 
 
Second, it accounts for Wolterstorff’s arguments.  It does not rest on a faulty 
foundationalist epistemology, opting instead for a purely moral approach.  And it does 
not unduly restrict religious reasons, for it does not restrict religious reasons as such.  
Rather, it restricts any use of reasons which are fundamental, fixed points of argument.  
The virtue of agreeableness only puts restrictions on those who strive for disagreement, 
who are not interested in making constructive discussion.  In fact, it coheres quite well 
with Wolterstorff’s consocial position, which thinks that restrictions ought to be put on 
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the manner of citizens’ behavior rather than the type of reasons they employ.  The 
‘virtue of agreeableness’ position wholeheartedly embraces this. 
 
Third, it accounts for Rorty’s concerns.  It provides us with a duty to keep the 
conversation going, and to avoid unarguable first principles for as long as we can.  It 
also gives us a commitment to commonality.  It allows us to embody fraternity through 
a democratic discourse aimed towards our similarities, our commonly held convictions.  
If this ends up on the level of religion or philosophy, or merely political reforms, the 
agreeable person does not care.  So long as she can find points of agreement from 
which to construct a discussion about the disagreements, she is satisfied. 
 
My real contention in this paper is that the debate ought to switch from “religious” 
versus “secular” to fundamentalist versus pragmatist.  The problem is not religious 
people with religiously motivated political positions, but fundamentalists of any kind 
who refuse to strive for the virtue of agreeableness when deciding and debating public 
policy.  I hope that this essay has made this more plausible, and that in the future the 
reader will be more inclined to frame the discussion in the following way.  Let us not 
look for religious or secular reasons, let us look for fundamentalist or pragmatist 
attitudes.  For only the latter distinction will be helpful when deciding who is 
committed to liberal democracy and who is not. 
 
 
 
 
Works Cited 
 
Rawls, John. “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical.” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 3 (1985), pp. 223-251. [JAF] 
 
Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999. [TJ] 
 
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2005. [PL] 
 
Rorty, Richard. Achieving Our Country. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
[AOC] 
 
Rorty, Richard. Philosophy and Social Hope. New York: Penguin Books, 1999. [PSH] 
 
Rorty, Richard. The Rorty Reader. ed. Christopher Voparil and Richard Bernstein. 
West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010. [RR] 
 
Res Cogitans (2014) 5                                                                                                         Morano | 120 
 
 
 2155-4838 | commons.pacificu.edu/rescogitans 
Wolterstorff, Nicholas and Robert Audi. Religion in the Public Square. Lanham: 
Rowman & 120Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997. [RPS] 
 
Wolterstorff, Nicholas. “An Engagement With Rorty.” From Understanding Liberal 
Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199558957.003.0003  [ER] 
 
 
